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I.  Introduction
A large number  of economists  have argued that even though the price elasticity of supply
of individual  crops may be large, the aggregate  agricultural  supply response is low.  While studies
on individual  crop response  abound, studies on aggregate  supply response  are few and far between.
Despite the paucity in the number of studies, the belief in the low aggregate  supply response  was
almost universal in the past.  And this belief constituted  one of the main arguments  for selecting
agricultural and industrial  policies in developing  countries  which turned the domestic  terms of trade
against agriculture. The impact  of these agricultural, industrial  and macroeconomic  policies was
examined  for eighteen  LDCs in Schiff and Valdes (1992a).
Starting  with Schultz (1964), a number of studies  on developing  countries  showed that if
farmers did not respond  much to changes  in incentives,  it was not so much due to their inability  to
adapt to changing  circumstances  but rather to the constraints  they were facing, and that the potential
for a significant  supply response  did exist if the constraints  were relaxed. (These findings imply
complementarity  between  higher prices and removal of constraints  rather than substitution  between
them, an important  issue to which we return below).  However, the controversy  has certainly not
been put to rest.  A large number, if not a majority,  of agricultural  economists  still argue that
aggregate  supply response  is very low.  A main reason is that the supply of most factors, and land in
particular, is fixed in the short run.  A related issue is the length  of time needed to obtain a given
response. A number of economists  have argued  that the response is not negligible  but takes time to
materialize.A similar controversy  also took place in the developed  countries in relation to agriculture's
aggregate  supply response  during the Great Depression.  For instance, Galbraith and Black (1938)
argued that aggregate  agricultural  supply was inelastic  in the U.S. since the fall in agricultural  prices
during the Great Depression  only had a negligible  effect on output and the output effect took long to
materialize. However, Johnson (1950) - in his classic paper on the nature of agricultural  supply -
showed  that the reason for the lack of output response  was that factor prices in agriculture  had fully
adjusted to the reduction  in demand. With factor prices in agriculture  adjusting  in parallel to output
prices, it is no surprise that the effect on agricultural  output was limited. This was not the case in the
urban sector where factor markets were generally  less competitive  (e.g., due to labor unions) and
where prices were generally  less flexible.
The objective  of this paper is to review a number  of issues on aggregate  supply response
which are still open.  The remainder  of the paper is organized  as follows. In Section II, we critically
review the literature on aggregate  supply response. We also review the importance  of non-price
factors or constraints  for supply response, as well as the interaction  between  price and non-price
factors.  We argue that the debate over whether  aggregate  supply response  is high or low does not
make much sense unless the conditions  under which the price change is undertaken  are specified.
These conditions  include  the provision of public goods, factors  affecting  the credibility  of the reform,
world market conditions  for the main agricultural  exports and imports, the price variability  under
which the reform is undertaken, and more.  These conditions  will also affect the speed of the
response. We also argue that estimates  of supply response  obtained  from time series data are
generally not useful for predicting  the impact  of a price reform and are generally  downward  biased.
Our argument is based both on economic  and econometric  considerations.
We also provide limited  empirical evidence  on some of the hypotheses  examined  in Section
II.  The data consist of over four hundred observations  from eighteen  developing  countries covering
-2  -the period 1960-1985. These data are from the World Bank research  project "A Comparative  Study
of the Political Economy  of Agricultural  Pricing Policies", and more specifically  from Schiff and
Valdes (1992a). Conclusions  are presented in Section  III.
II.  A Survey of Selected Issues
A. Cross-Country  Estimadon
In a well-known  study, Peterson (1979) estimated  a cross-country  supply function  and
obtained  an aggregate  supply elasticity  E of 1.66.  He also estimated  the regression with a technology
variable, with E equal to 1.27.  Peterson concluded  that E is between 1.27 and 1.66, and is much
larger than the value of 0 to 0.2 obtained  in most time series studies. He makes the important  point
that the prices obtained from time series data are mainly drawn from a given price regime --
reflecting  mainly short-run  variation in price -- while prices obtained  from cross-country  data better
reflect differences  in price regimes. The latter will therefore provide  estimates  which better reflect
long-term  phenomena.
There are however a number of problems  with Peterson's results.  If supply shifters are
positively  correlated with prices across countries,  then omitting  these shifters will result in an
overestimation  of E. Chhibber  (1989) tested the hypothesis  using Peterson's data and adding  several
shifters.  When he added an irrigation  variable, E fell from 1.27 to 0.97.  Including  other variables
had a similar effect.  However, even after these adjustments,  the value of E was still larger than in
most time series estimations. Thus, despite some problems  with his analysis, Petersen's contribution
was to show the problem of estimating  long-term  elasticity  with time series data.  We return to this
issue below.
- 3-B. Aggregate Supply Response in Sub-Saharan  Africa
Much of the controversy  on the aggregate  supply response relates to Sub-Saharan  Africa
(SSA). Therefore, we examine  the studies on this region in more detail. Several papers have claimed
that SSA agriculture  exhibits a low aggregate  supply response. However, these studies do contain a
number  of apparent inconsistencies. In a frequently  cited paper, Bond (1983) claims that the
aggregate supply  elasticity in seven of nine SSA countries  examnined  is not statistically  significant.
However, her dependent  variable is not output but output  per capita.  Unless  population  is
uncorrelated  with output, the coefficient  obtained is a biased estimate  of the elasticity  parameter.  If,
as would be expected, output and population  both increased  over time, it would imply a positive
correlation  between them, resulting  in a downward  bias in the elasticity  estimate.
Delgado  and Mellor (1984) and De Janvry (1986) also claim  that aggregate  supply is
highly inelastic in SSA, though they do not provide  their own estimates. However, Delgado and
Mellor implicitly  assume that private investment  is not responsive  to price and they only consider the
short-term impact  of prices on output  through increases  in variable factors. On the other hand, they
and de Janvry claim that the Dutch disease  phenomenon  (due to booming  export sectors and foreign
aid) and industrial  protection  have led to massive  outmigration  of agricultural  labor to other sectors of
the economy. This seems to contradict  the claim of low aggregate  supply response.
In order to resolve this apparent inconsistency,  a number of economists  have argued that
hysteresis is present in the sense that the outflows  of labor from agriculture, once they have occurred,
are irreversible. Hence, they argue that there is a basic asymmetry  in supply response: low for price
increases  and high for price decreases. The same claim has been made in another context by
Boussard  (1985) who states that "... there is no reason for believing  that elasticity obeys the same
rules when supply is increasing  as when it is decreasing". H6wever, this claim does not seem to be
supported  by the available evidence  for Africa. First, there is evidence  that reverse migration  back to
-4-agriculture has occurred in a number  of countries. For instance, Jaeger (1989) reports the findings of
Ghana's Living Standard  Survey carried out by the World Bank.  It shows that since the reform
program was implemented  in 1984, the number  of people moving  from non-agricultural  occupations
back to agricultural  occupations  has been twice as large as the number of those moving in the
opposite  direction. Jaeger also reports evidence  of such reverse migration  in Nigeria and Tanzania.
Second, the proposition  of low aggregate  supply response  to a price increase  can be tested
by comparing the agricultural  performance  of countries  which have carried out structural adjustment
programs with those that have not.  Basic  elements  of these  programs have typically  been industrial
trade liberalization  and real exchange  rate depreciation,  and thus a reduction in the indirect taxation  of
agriculture (Schiff and Valdes 1992a, 1992b).  1
Have the higher relative prices for agriculture  led to higher growth rates in the reforming
African countries, or does Africa  suffer from low aggregate  supply response  with respect to price
increases? Cleaver (1988)  tested this proposition  by comparing  sixteen adjusting  countries  with the
non-adjusting  countries. While the agricultural  growth rates for the two groups were about the same
in 1970-80,  the reforming countries  experienced  a highdr annual growth rate following  the reforms,
with the difference  in growth rates being 0.9 percentage  points in 1980-85  and 2.6 percentage  points
in 1987. As stated by Binswanger  (1989) in his review  paper, the difference  in growth rates between
the two groups clearly increases  over time and shows the high degree of responsiveness  of African
agriculture to policy changes which raise agriculture's domestic  terms of trade.
Interestingly,  Cleaver found that most of the increased  growth was for exportables  rather
than for food crops.  Binswanger  (1989)  suggests  two explanations  for this result. First, as shown in
Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988) and in Schiff and Valdes (1992a, 1992b),  direct protection of
1 Indirect taxation of agriculture  is defined as the reduction in agriculture's domestic  terms of
trade due to expansive  macroeconomic  policies and-industrial  protection  policies.
-5-staples was positive in most Sub-Saharan  African  countries  in their sample, so that total taxation  was
small -- an average of about 10 percent. On the other hand,  direct taxation  of exportables  was about
20 percent and total taxation  averaged over 40 percent. Hence, overall reform raised exportable
prices significantly  more than staple prices. Thus, in addition  to an increase in aggregate  supply, one
would expect a shift in resources from staples  to exportables. Second, since adjustment  is often
associated  with contraction  of aggregate  demand, it may lead to lower demand for food, thereby
resulting  in a contraction  in the supply of nontradable  staples. In other words, the price of tradable
food products rose relative  to non-agricultural  prices but fell relative to agricultural  exportable  prices.
Hence, the net effect on output is ambiguous. Furthermore,  non-tradable  food prices may have fallen
due to lower demand.
In some countries, long-standing  adverse  conditions  and policies may have resulted in a
considerable  deterioration  of the infrastructure,  including  rural roads and research and extension
systems. The countries  where this deterioration  has been worse will have a lower (and slower) supply
response (see the next section)  and will require rehabilitation  of the infrastructure  in order to generate
a significant  response. Assuming  that the adjusting  countries were generally  those which had worse
economic  policies, infrastructure  would have suffered more in the adjusting  than in the non-adjusting
countries, and one might have expected  little impact  from economic  reform on agricultural  growth, at
least for a while.  Nevertheless,  Cleaver found higher agricultural  growth rates for adjusting  than for
non-adjusting  countries.
In the case of exportables,  Balassa  (1986) found a high elasticity  with respect to incentives.
He found that the elasticity  of the share of exports in total output with respect to the real exchange
rate was 0.68 for LDCs as a whole and about  double (1.35) for Sub-Saharan  Africa. In contradiction
to the belief by many economists  that the supply  response in Africa is extremely  low, the results of
both Cleaver and Balassa  imply a significant  response in Sub-Saharan  Africa. These findings are also
- 6 -supported by Jaeger (1990) for the period 1982-88. He states that countries  which adopted or
maintained  favorable policy environments  (FPE) experienced  higher agricultural  output and export
growth and higher overall economic  growth than countries  with unfavorable  policy environment
(UPE).  Between 1982  and 1988, agricultural  exports and value added rose 4.15 and 3.50 percent,
respectively, in FPE countries, while both indicators  fell in UPE countries.
Platteau  (1993) also examines  the agricultural  performance  of FPE and UPE countries in
Sub-Saharan  Africa for exports, food and total agricultural  output. He finds a difference  in the
performance  of the two groups of countries  but not a statistically  significant  one.  However, his result
may be due to the small sample of countries  examined,  in which case rejection  of the null hypothesis
(no difference in performance  of FPE and UPE countries)  is hard to obtain.
Markets in Africa and other developing  countries  are often in disequilibrium  and
quantitative  controls prevail.  This provides another reason why prices have a positive impact on
output, as in the case of inefficient  banking and financial  systems  with widespread  quantitative
controls (or as Boussard 1985 calls, liquidity  constraints). If small farmers have no access to credit
or if it is rationed, then even if there are profitable  investments  to be made on their own farm (at
reasonable interest rates), no investment  will be made.  In that case, a higher price for their product
will generate  higher profits for the small farmers which can be reinvested. This issue is more
important  the larger the difference  between  the lending  and borrowing rates for those whose access to
the credit markets is limited. Thus, this issue will be of less importance  in developed  countries where
financial  markets operate more efficiently, and it is most important  in the economies  where financial
sectors are the least developed  (such as in SSA). However, it is relevant  to developing  countries in
general as credit rationing exists or has existed  in one form or another in those countries.2
2 Even in the absence  of credit rationing, if the financial  system is small and undiversified,  such
as rural banks whose portfolios  are concentrated  in loans with highly correlated returns, the risk
premium charged small farmers will be high and investments  will only be profitable  if financed out of
-7  -C. Prices versus Public Goods
Based on the view of a low aggregate  supply response, both de Janvry and Delgado-Mellor
claim that publicly  provided inputs are more effective  than prices in raising agricultural  output.  As
mentioned  above, these authors abstract from the impact  of incentives  on private investment  decisions.
But more importantly,  why is so much of the profession  focused  on the dichotomy  between  prices and
public goods? It has been shown (Schiff, 1987)  that prices and public goods are complements  in the
sense that a higher level of public goods raises the impact  of prices on output, and vice versa, that
higher agricultural  prices raise the impact  that investments  in public goods have on output. The same
point is made by Oyejide (1984) and Braverman (1989).  Commander (1989) also argues for  "...  the
combined  role of price and other policy variables in raising  output levels" (page 236).  He also
recognizes  that investment  and technical  change will at least in part be price-driven. The issue of
induced innovation,  with technical change  depending  on prices, was examined  in detail by Hayami
and Ruttan (1985).
Chhibber  (1989) summarizes  the empirical literature  and finds evidence  on
complementarity. He states  that the long-run  aggregate  supply elasticity  in the poorer LDCs with
inadequate  infrastructural  facilities  is 0.3 to 0.5.  On the other hand, in the more advanced LDCs
with better provision of public goods, the elasticity is 0.7 to 0.9.
We use data from Schiff and Valdes (1992a)  to test the complementarity  hypothesis. The
sample covers the period 1960-1985  for eighteen  countries. These are: Argentina,  Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Chile and the Dominican  Republic  in Latin America;  Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan,  the
Philippines,  Sri Lanka and Thailand  in Asia; Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana and Zambia in SSA; and Egypt,
Morocco, Portugal and Turkey in the Mediterranean  area.
own profits.
-8-For the public goods  variable, we use an index GIB, defined as
GIB - (GIA/GI)/(AGDP/GDP),  (1)
where GIA/GI is the share of public investment  expenditures  on agriculture GIA relative to total
public investment  expenditures  GI, and AGDP/GDP  is the share of agriculture's GDP (AGDP) in
total GDP.  A value of GIB equal to (smaller than) one means  that the share of public investment
funds going to agriculture  is equal to (smaller  than) the share of agriculture in GDP.
As a price variable, we choose agriculture's  domestic terms of trade PAPNA, defined as
PAPNA  PA/PNA,  (2)
where PA is an index  of agricultural  prices and PNA is an index  of non-agricultural  prices.
We make use of country (intercept)  dummy  variables because  the index  PAPNA is comparable
over time but is not directly  comparable  across countries. Another reason is that the GIB index is
comparable  over time but may not be comparable  across countries  because of possible definitional
problems. These cross-country  differences  are then captured  by the country dummies. We also used
country  slope dummies  but they turned out to be non-significant  in almost all cases and did not
improve  the estimation  results.  We ran a regression of AGDP  (agricultural  GDP) on a constant (not
shown), PAPNA (lagged), GIB, and on an interaction  term INT of GIB and PAPNA. The results are
shown in equation (3).
logAGDP  =  0.47IogPAPNA  +  0.08logGIB  + 0.20INT,  R2 =  0.98  (3)
(6.40)  (1.28)  (2.11)
-9-We found that all variables  have the correct sign (positive). The price variable  is significant
at the one percent significance  level, the interaction  term is significant  at the five percent level and the
public goods variable GIB is significant  at the 20 percent level. A positive coefficient  for the
interaction  variable implies  complementarily. The aggregate  price elasticity  of supply is E = 0.47 +
0.2logGIB, and E increases  with GIB.
Those authors who have argued that public goods  are more effective than prices in raising
aggregate output (Delgado-Mellor,  de Janvry) have based their argument  on the fact that the price
elasticity is smaller than the elasticity with respect to non-price  factors. As Chhibber (1989) states:
"If farmers cannot respond sufficiently  to higher prices because  of constraints  due to inadequate
irrigation, unimaginative  and inefficient  research  and extension  services or poor transport facilities,
then improvement  of these goods and services may do more for agriculture  than a policy of higher
prices" (p. 55).  The above is certainly  possible. However, deciding  which of the two policies to
pursue based on a comparison  of the two elasticities  will inevitably  lead to a misallocation  of
resources.
First, the relative size of the two elasticities  has no one-to-one  relationship  to the relative
budgetary  cost of achieving  a given output increase. The reason is that the elasticity of output with
respect to the stock of public goods  does not capture what the cost of these public goods is.  Say the
elasticity with respect to public goods  is 0.8 and the elasticity  with respect to price is E =  1.0.
Assume also that the annual budgetary  cost of raising output  by a given quantity  is the same whether
prices are used or public goods. Alternatively,  assume that the elasticity  with respect to public goods
doubles to 1.6 and the price of public goods triples.  In this case, the budgetary  cost of obtaining  a
given output increase  will be lower with price policy than with public goods, even though the
elasticity with respect to public goods is higher in this case.  What is missing from the elasticity
comparison is the unit cost of public goods versus the price of the relevant  agricultural  products.  For
- 10  -given elasticities, the higher the price of agricultural products relative to the unit cost of public goods,
the more attractive the public goods option becomes.
This idea of comparing the budgetary cost of these two policies in raising output has been
suggested in the literature.  We argue that such a comparison is problematic as well.  The reason is
that different types of costs are being compared.  Raising the price of agricultural output entails a
transfer to producers from consumers or from taxpayers.  On the other hand, investing in public
goods entails the use of real resources which have a real opportunity cost.  Therefore,  the correct
comparison is between the amount spent annually on public goods to raise output by a given amount
and the value of the privately provided resources needed to increase output by the same amount in
response to the higher price.  In fact, both should be used in such a way that the real rates of return
to public and private resources are equalized.  And these rates of return should also equal the rates of
return to public and private resources outside agriculture.  Then, the total level of public goods and
its allocation across sectors will be optimal.  It should also be remembered that because of
complementarily,  the return to private resources will rise with the level of public goods and vice
versa.  It is essential to note that the conditions given above will generate an optimal allocation of
resources  if and only if the prices reflect the actual opportunity costs for the economy, i.e.,  if they
are free of intervention.
Returning to the budgetary  issue, it has been argued that price  reform and investment in
public goods compete for scarce public resources.  It is true that if food price reform  implies higher
producer prices which are not passed on to consumers,  it will involve food subsidies.  However, as
noted earlier,  Schiff and Valdes (1992a) found that direct (or sectoral) intervention protected  food
production in most LDCs,  with countries such as Egypt,  Argentina and Zambia being the exception
rather than the rule.  Thus, food price reform would entail lower rather than higher producer prices
in most countries and would thus have little budgetary impact.  And in countries such as Egypt where
- 11  -food imports are subsidized, higher producer prices,  if passed on to consumers,  will lower the amount
of subsidies.  As discussed in Schiff and Valdes (1992b), for those countries where agricultural export
taxes still provide a significant share of government revenue, price policy reform will have to be
accompanied by a tax reform.
Moreover,  the same paper argues that to provide transparency and credibility,  agricultural
price  reform  should be accompanied by reforms in the marketing and distribution of inputs and
outputs.  This includes the dismantling of inefficient and bloated parastatals, examples of which
abound in the literature  (e.g.,  Krueger  1992).  Many of the services provided by these parastatals can
be better  provided by the private sector once prices are allowed to reflect true opportunity costs.  For
instance, a practice followed in a number of SSA countries is to charge constant prices over space
(panterritorial  pricing) and over the crop year.  Liberalizing those prices will provide incentives for,
and will lead to, private transport and storage services.  Thus,  if the public sector were to limit its
activities to the provision of true public goods, the large revenue savings could finance part or all of
the revenue losses from the price reform and the latter would not necessarily  impose a burden on the
budget.
Furthermore,  the above deals with the removal of direct price  interventions.  As reported
in Schiff and Valdes (1992a), agricultural price  interventions in LDCs were dominated by indirect
interventions.  The latter  were dominated by industrial protection policies which resulted in an
average tax on agriculture  relative to industry over the period 1960-85 of 28 percent.  Reduction of
that tax on agriculture would entail a policy of trade liberalization.  An import first step in the process
of trade liberalization is tariffication, whereby import quotas, licenses and prohibitions are replaced
by equivalent tariffs (so that the price structure is maintained).  Such a process would generate
additional government revenues.  In a second stage, the degree of uniformity of the tariff structure
would be increased.  And the impact of that on revenue would depend on the level of the uniform
- 12 -tariff which would be chosen and on the import response.  The level of revenues at the lower, more
uniform tariff need not be lower than at the higher protection level dominated by quantitative
restrictions.  Hence, the process of raising relative agricultural prices through a reduction of industrial
protection  need not have adverse fiscal implications.  Thus,  if accompanied by public sector reform
and trade  reform,  price reform  need not compete with the provision of public goods for scarce public
funds.
D.  Tune Series Estimaion  and Price Refonn
Another question is whether most analyses based on single-equation regressions are able
to capture the long-term effects of price reform.  Long-term aggregate supply response depends  on
the response of private investment, labor migration and the adoption of new techniques.  These
phenomena can only be captured in a dynamic general equilibrium framework which allows for
intersectoral resource flows in response to changes in incentives.  This approach was launched by
Mundlak in a number of studies on Argentina and Chile (Cavallo and Mundlak  1982, Coeymans and
Mundlak  1992, Mundlak, Cavallo and Domenech 1992).  Other studies using such an approach
include Cavallo (1988) and Hurtado,  Valdes and Muchnik (1990).
Based on Mundlak, Cavallo and Domenech's  study for Argentina, Cavallo found that the
aggregate price elasticity is 0.07 after one year,  0.16 after three years,  0.36 after five years,  0.71
after ten years and 1.78 after twenty years.  He concludes that the long-run elasticity is large but that
reaching that level takes a long time.  Over the period 1960-84, removal of the total tax on
Argentina's  agriculture would have raised its domestic terms of trade by about 65 percent (Schiff and
Valdes 1992a).  This would have implied an output increase of 4.5 percent after one year,  10.3
percent after three years,  23 percent after five years,  45.6 percent after ten years and 114.3 percent
after twenty years.  Thus,  even though the short-term and medium-term elasticities may be low, the
- 13 -extent of agricultural  taxation was such that removal of total agricultural  taxes would have led to a
substantial aggregate output response in a relatively short period of time.  In the case of Chile,
Coeymans and Mundlak found higher medium-term elasticities (0.6 after four years) but lower  long-
term elasticities (1.4 after nineteen years) than in Argentina.
These dynamic general equilibrium models generate higher supply responses than the
single equation time-series regressions.  Nevertheless,  there are several reasons why even these higher
supply response estimates would be expected to be biased downwards.  First,  the general equilibrium
models assume that total private investment is given and it is only the intersectoral allocation of that
given total that responds to incentive changes.  Agricultural price reforms have recently been part of
wider  reform packages which include stabilization as well as trade and domestic market liberalization
measures.  These reforms are designed in part to increase domestic and foreign investment over time
as credibility in the package grows.  For instance, Chile has experienced significant increases in
domestic saving and in domestic and foreign investment following its reforms,  part of which has gone
to increase agricultural  output and exports.  And foreign investment in Latin America has more than
quintupled from  1986 to  1994.  These potentially important effects are not captured by these models,
though they could conceivably be incorporated in them.3
Second, and this applies to all time series  studies, estimates of aggregate supply response
are a poor instrument to forecast the impact of a price reform.  For instance, Argentina experienced a
very high degree of inflation and of relative-price variability over the period examined by Mundlak
et. al.,  and one would expect a low degree of price  response under such conditions.  On the other
hand, one would expect a larger response to a credible reform.  In other words, if farmers operate
3  On the other hand, if the estimation period was one of high availability of unused land (as,
say, in Thailand) and if the availability of such land was significantly reduced over time, then the
parameter  value will provide an upward-biased estimate of the supply response to a future price
increase.
- 14  -under a given price regime or distribution,  they will not react to random  annual price changes  within
that regime as significantly  as they would if the entire price distribution  were raised due to, say, the
permanent  elimination  of export taxes or import  subsidies.
And if the change in policy regime is part of a larger macroeconomic  stabilization
package that reduces  overall and relative  price variability  (so that the mean price increases  while its
variance falls), one would expect the supply response  to be higher still.4 The effect of price
variability  on output  was examined  in Just (1974) and the effect of price uncertainty  on output was
examined  in Schiff (1986). Both found the impact  to be significantly  negative. Similarly, in a study
of aggregate  supply response in the Ajmer district in India, Bapna  (1980) found much lower supply
elasticities  (from 0.2 to 0.25) when using the volatile  lagged price as the expected  price than when
using a (more stable) moving  average (with elasticities  of 0.5 to 0.6).
We are thus arguing  that the supply response  models estimated  from time series data are
subject to the fundamental  "Lucas  critique" (Lucas 1976). In estimating  the relevant  parameters, the
objective  is to estimate the outcome  of the joint interaction  of optimizing  agents' decision  rules and
market clearing  conditions  (world prices, trade barriers, etc.) for a given  policy regime.  Any change
in policy regime will affect the decision rules and thus will affect the parameter estimates. Hence, the
time series parameter estimates  will not be useful for appraising  the impact  of policy changes which
affect the economic  environment. The Lucas  critique is particularly relevant  for developing  countries
which are undergoing  comprehensive  reform. Under those circumstances,  it is unrealistic to expect
the past to be a good predictor of the future.
4 On the other hand, Schiff and Valdes (1992a)  found that removal of direct interventions  results
in higher agricultural  price variability  in most countries  examined.
- 15  -To illustrate  the point, take the example  where producers expect the price to be 50 with
0.2 probability, and 10 with 0.8 probability. 5 This is the low price regime, and the expected  price
is 18.  The expected  price is independent  of the actual price as long as the regime is unchanged. In
that case, a change in price from 10 to 50 should have no effect on output  as the price change is
considered  entirely random, and the estimated  value of the elasticity  of supply based on observations
generated  by the low price regime will be very low. On the other hand, assume a price reform that
results in a high price regime - say a price of 50 with 0.8 probability  and 10 with 0.2 probability. In
this case, the increase in price from 10 to 50 signals a change  in price regime (a reform).  It will
result in a higher expected  price (42 rather than 18) and will thus result in a larger supply response.
There is a deeper sense in which the past may not be a good predictor of the future. The
elasticities  are estimated  for a bundle  of goods. These may very well change  with price reform.  No
econometric  method exists which can estimate  the response  to a price reform of goods and services
which were not produced  before the reform took place.  Thus, all empirical methods  are subject to
the "output  mix" critique. 6
This issue is highly relevant for agriculture. For instance, who would have thought that
following  its reforms, Chile would become a major supplier  of Winter grapes, kiwis, and a host of
other fruits and vegetables? And that Mauritius  would be expanding  from sugar exports to exports of
exotic flowers and fruits to the EC? And would Egypt  - a country  with a limited amount of highly
valuable irrigated land along the Nile - continue  to produce  basic staples  following  a comprehensive
reform? One might expect that it would experience  a significant  shift in output mix towards high
value added export products (fruits, vegetables,  flowers). It would seem that the only method
available to assess the effect of price reform on output  mix would be to observe the change in output
5 This example  was suggested  to us by J. Quiroz.
6 This important  point cane to our attention  through conversations  with A. Valdes.
- 16 -mix which occurred in comparable countries which undertook an earlier reform.  Hence,  econometric
estimates of aggregate supply response based on time series estimation - whether single equation
reduced forms or general equilibrium models - are of limited use for evaluating the impact of changes
in policy both because of the Lucas critique and of the "output mix" critique.
Recent economic reforms have not always had the expected impact on agricultural output.
However, reforms do not occur in a world of "ceteris paribus".  In fact, commodity prices fell to low
levels until recently.  Second, successful economic reforms have led to capital inflows in a number of
countries and to real exchange rate appreciation, thereby lowering relative agricultural prices.  This is
examined in detail in Valdes (1993) for Chile and New Zealand.  Hence,  the output response to the
economic reform  in those cases has been dampened by the fall in world prices and by  real exchange
rate appreciation.
So far we have examined the size of the aggregate output response to a price reform.
What about the speed of the response?  First,  measuring the speed of the response to a price  reform  is
also subject to the Lucas critique.  As time series estimates may not accurately reflect the size of the
response to a reform,  the same is true about measuring the time path of the response.  Second, the
speed of the response will be affected by the credibility of the reform.  If there  is little credibility,
producers will prefer to wait and see before making irreversible investment decisions.  Also, from the
time a reform  is announced by the executive branch of government, the speed of the response will
also depend on how quickly the reform package goes through the legislature, how the package
changes through that process, how quickly it is put into place,  and how effective the implementation
actually is.
- 17 -E. Size of the Aricutural  Sector and S,pply Response
It is generally argued  that the larger the share of agriculture  in GDP, the less elastic the
supply of factors to agriculture  and therefore  the lower the aggregate  supply response (Valdes, 1989).
To test this hypothesis, we ran a regression  of agricultural  GDP (AGDP)  on agriculture's domestic
terms of trade PAPNA and on an interaction  term INT of PAPNA and the share SHAG  of agriculture
in GDP.  As a sample, we used the annual  observations  over twenty five years and eighteen  countries
described in the context of equation  (3).  The results are shown in equation (4).
logAGDP = 0.42IogPAPNA  -0.6INT,  R2 = 0.96.  (4)
(7.83)  (-10.2)
Both variables are highly significant. As predicted, the regression results imply that the
supply response is negatively  related to the share of agriculture  in GDP, with the elasticity  being E =
0.42 - 0.6SHAG.
Since we use country (intercept)  dummies, ours is essentially  a time series analysis, and
the results cannot be used to make cross-country  inferences. However, the negative  relation between
price elasticity and the share of agriculture  in GDP is generally  assumed  to hold in a cross-country
framework  as well.  The problem  with such an inference  is that the share of agriculture  in GDP is
assumed to be given exogenously  when it is in fact determined  endogenously,  in part by the
availability  of agricultural resources such as land.  Thus, Country A may have a larger agricultural
share in GDP than Country B because  of more elastic supplies  of agricultural  resources and a higher
elasticity  when measured for a same agricultural  share in both countries. To know what happens at
the equilibrium,  one needs to estimate  a model which endogenizes  the agricultural  share variable as
well as the supply elasticity.
- 18 -F. Supporting Framework
Supply response depends  also on the availability  (quantity, quality, cost) of supporting
services  and on the legal and institutional  framework. Some of this was examined  in Section C above
in the discussion  on the complementarily  between  prices and public goods. Another aspect is the
legal and institutional  framework. For instance, restrictions  on land tenure rights and other tenurial
arrangements  have been found to severely  dampen the supply response  by limiting  private investment.
Valdes (1993) argues that despite  favorable trade and macroeconomic  reforms, the impact  on private
investment  in agriculture  in Chile would have been very limited had it not been for the land market
reform which provided legal commitment  to secure property rights and a free land market.
Restrictions  in the labor market can also limit supply response  (more on this below in the discussion
on ports).  Also, in a number  of reforming  countries, rural infrastructure  had been allowed  to
deteriorate in the period preceding the reforms, and this deterioration  is expected  to limit the response
of agricultural  output to the reforms.
An efficient management  of these resources  is also important. A price increase provided
by a marketing  board may have little impact  on aggregate  supply if the board is inefficient  in
transporting  and distributing  inputs and output, if it is not adequately  financed and if bottlenecks  are
common. In that case, a reform should be enacted  which would at a minimum  allow the  private
sector to compete  with the marketing  board.  Of course,  if the board sets constant  prices over the
crop year and over space  (panterritorial  pricing) - both quite common in SSA - and therefore
subsidizes  both storage and transport, then no private entrepreneur  will be able to compete  and there
will be no private provision of transport and storage services. Thus, in order for the private sector to
compete, the marketing  board's pricing rules must become more competitive  and reflect true
opportunity  costs.  Some marketing  boards may be unable to survive private sector competition  under
- 19  -such conditions. In that case, the best solution  might simply  be to allow the marketing  board to go
out of business.
Port management  may also be important,  especially  for agricultural  exports.  Labor in
many ports are (or were) unionized, with high wages and quantitative  restrictions  on labor supply
(e.g., one eight-hour  shift per day).  Reforming  the labor market in those ports can significantly
reduce costs, by reducing wages  and by allowing  three shifts to operate. Such cost reductions  at the
port entail a non-negligible  reduction  in the overall cost of exporting agricultural  products. Such
infrastructural  bottlenecks  may sometimes  be relaxed simply  through improved  legislation  and
operating rules.  In the case of ports, such an improvement  will result in an increased supply of
portuary services for a given level of port facilities  and will result in an increased  supply of
exportables. The same is true of the removal  of monopoly  power in air transport.
The entire issue  of an adequate  supporting  environment  and its impact on aggregate
supply requires more systematic  study. A first step might be to realize that what matters is not
simply the efficiency  of producing  a given  commodity  but also the efficiency  of delivering  it to the
consumer. This includes  transport, storage, quality control, and more.  And the relevant  cost of
production is not the farmgate  cost but is the cost at the consumption  point, whether consumption  is
domestic or not.
III. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we provided  a survey of selected  aspects of the literature on aggregate
agricultural supply response in developing  countries  and presented  some limited evidence. The latter
is based on data from the World Bank research  project "A Comparative  Study of the Political
Economy  of Agricultural  Pricing Policies", and more specifically  on Schiff and Valdes (1992a).
- 20  -First, we argued that the time series and other studies claiming  a highly inelastic  aggregate
supply for agriculture  in Africa are flawed. Second, a number  of authors have looked  at price policy
and investment  in public goods as competing  alternatives,  and have compared  the output elasticity
with respect to the two policies in order to determine  which of the policies is more effective. We
have argued that these two policies  are in fact complementary. We have also argued that comparing
the output elasticity  with respect  to prices and public goods makes  no sense whatsoever. We
proposed an alternative  criterion in order to achieve  an optimal  use of both policies. Our empirical
results provide some support for the argument  of complementarily  between  prices and public goods.
We found that an increase in the share of public expenditures  going to agriculture had a positive
impact on the aggregate  supply response.
We also argued that dynamic  general equilibrium  models (a la Mundlak)  - where intersectoral
factor movements  respond  to incentives  - are necessary  to obtain a more realistic representation  of the
real economic  phenomena  underlying  aggregate  supply response. In fact, such models  have generated
higher aggregate  supply elasticities  than single-equation  time series regressions. However, both the
single equation and general equilibrium  time series estimates  are, for two reasons, poor instruments
for forecasting  the impact  of a price reform. The first reason is known  as the Lucas critique. For
instance, if the reform affects  the variability of prices as well as its level, then the price level
parameter will not provide a reliable estimate  of the supply  response to the price change. And if the
reform affects the manner in which expectations  on prices and other variables are formed, the same
problem will arise.  The second reason is the "output  mix" critique.
Thus, even though time series estimates  can provide an accurate  picture of past behavioral
relations, they will not serve as an adequate  basis for forecasting  the impact  of policy reform. This is
especially  true for developing  countries  where policy reforms have included  agricultural  sector price
reform, industrial  trade liberalization,  financial  sector reform and macroeconomic  stabilization.
- 21  -Under those circumstances,  parameter  values obtained  under the past policy regime will have little
relevance in the new regime.  Models free of the Lucas critique have been formulated  in order to
estimate  the impact  of trade liberalization  on the real exchange  rate (Quiroz and Chumacero 1993).
Formulation  of similar models  to be applied  to the issue of aggregate  agricultural  supply response is
part of these authors' research agenda.
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